Towards Safe Kernel Extensibility With eBPF

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eBPF Lacks Run-time Memory Safety

USER SPACE Clang/LLVM **ELF Loader** .elf .c KERNEL SPACE eBPF Verifier Arbitrary kernel memory access The eBPF verifier is unsound. Static analysis alone cannot guarantee run-time safety. **eBPF** JIT Compiler **Binary**






SafeBPF


Dynamic Sandboxing of eBPF Programs with Software Fault Isolation and Hardware-Assisted Memory Tagging to enforce spatial memory safety at runtime.

Lim, Soo Yee, et al. "SafeBPF: Hardware-assisted Defense-in-depth for eBPF Kernel Extensions." Proceedings of the 2024 on Cloud Computing Security Workshop. 2024.




Software Fault Isolation





Consider an invalid memory access at address 0xB123




All memory accesses always fall within the eBPF sandbox.



Memory Tagging with ARM MTE







Evaluation Results



- SafeBPF successfully prevents 7 high-severity vulnerabilities.
- SafeBPF incurs 0% 4% overhead on webserver macrobenchmarks.





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Proceedings will be available at the the Cloud Computing Security Workshop 2024.

Other eBPF Work

Lim, Soo Yee, Bogdan Stelea, Xueyuan Han, and Thomas Pasquier. "Secure namespaced kernel audit for containers." In *Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Cloud Computing*. 2021.

Cao, Xuechun, Shaurya Patel, **Soo Yee Lim**, Xueyuan Han, and Thomas Pasquier. "FetchBPF: Customizable Prefetching Policies in Linux with eBPF." In *USENIX Annual Technical Conference*. 2024.

